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4 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Second Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 4 February 1972, 1430 hours

1. Present were:

Members:

Chairman	Mr. Bronson Tweedy, D/DCI/NIPE
NSC Staff	Mr. Andrew Marshall
State Dept.	Dr. Ray Cline
	Mr. Seymour Weiss
Defense Dept.	Dr. Albert Hall, ASD/I
	Vice Admiral John Weinel, J-5/JCS
	Lt. General Donald V. Bennett, DIA
Justice Dept.	Mr. Robert C. Mardian
CIA	Dr. Edward W. Proctor
	Mr. John W. Huizenga

Others:

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State Dept.	Mr. Richard Curl
CIA	[redacted]

2. Mr. Tweedy introduced General Thomas as Chief of the NIPE Product Review Group (x-4445), and noted that he would provide staff support to the Working Group. Mr. Tweedy asked that each member provide to General Thomas the name of the individual in his department or agency who would serve as primary contact point.

3. Mr. Tweedy expressed the hope that the Working Group would normally handle its business in one to one and a half hours, and said he would always try to provide the agenda at least one working week before a meeting. He thanked the members for their inputs following the first meeting and noted these replies had been of considerable value in preparation of the project proposals for today's agenda.

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4. Mr. Tweedy noted the Group was to consider 12 projects and pointed out that it was clear that, even if all were approved, they could not be accomplished simultaneously and the Group would have to set some priorities. He stated that once the Group had decided on a program, he would forward it to Mr. Kissinger for presentation to NSCIC. Mr. Tweedy then suggested the Group consider each project in the order they were listed.

5. Mr. Cline stated that he wished first to make a general comment. He first agreed with Mr. Tweedy's point on a small number of projects for current action. Secondly, Mr. Cline noted the proposed projects applied only to consumer and substantive considerations. He pointed out the State Department input had recommended a number of projects which related to intelligence resources. If it did not look at resources, Mr. Cline felt the Group would be limiting itself to a one-sided view. He regarded NSCIC as the senior intelligence committee which looked at the hard problems of intelligence, be they concerns in the USIB or the IRAC area.

6. Mr. Tweedy pointed out that the President's 5 November memorandum was rather clear on the subject of NSCIC's substantive role. He stated that NSCIC should not become involved in resource issues and further indicated that he believed the Chairman of the NSCIC would insist upon this. However, he noted that any Working Group member could at any time table items on resources or any other matter for referral to IRAC and USIB as appropriate.

7. Mr. Marshall said he agreed with Mr. Tweedy in principle; however, it was difficult to forecast what kinds of data would be required or necessary to consider in any given project. He noted that a study might propose alternative actions for consideration, based not only on substantive conclusions but on varying resource demands as well. Mr. Tweedy noted, however, that once resource decisions became involved, the problem would move to another forum.

8. Dr. Hall agreed generally with this proposition but suggested the Group had to consider each project as an individual case, and, if resource considerations were required, they should be dealt with accordingly.

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9. Mr. Mardian related his reaction to the first meeting and his feeling then that he could not contribute meaningfully. He stated, however, that the Attorney General had since pointed out to him that the NSCIC mission of providing guidance was of exceptional importance, particularly in view of the President's program and the major effort to be mounted against international narcotics traffic. Mr. Mardian said he felt that the narcotics problem should have a higher priority in the Group's consideration of projects.

10. Mr. Tweedy noted that the narcotics trade was already the subject of a major effort and the CCPC and other committees were working in this area. Mr. Mardian agreed but proceeded to make several points. First, he thought the committee's problem was one of first determining the consumer's need and, in this context, he pointed out that there were numerous agencies involved in attacking the narcotics problem, with the central effort being headed up by Mr. Miles Ambrose. Second, he said that, having the needs, the committee's job was to assess the needs and capabilities and come to some determination as to the adequacy of the effort. This, he said, would allow NSCIC to issue such guidance as it deemed necessary.

11. Mr. Tweedy said a paper could be provided which describes what is being done by the Intelligence Community, who is involved, what mechanisms are at work and against what requirements. Mr. Mardian stated he considered looking at capabilities first was putting the cart before the horse. He suggested Mr. Ambrose put together a paper setting forth what his program needed and then have intelligence respond with a report on the availability of current and planned capabilities. What would follow would be an assessment as to the adequacy of the program and proposal for guidance by the NSCIC. Mr. Mardian noted that the narcotics program had top priority in the Justice Department but that Mr. Ambrose did not have the capability to make the assessment and judgments which he felt were asked for and apparent in the NSCIC mission.

12. Mr. Tweedy said he felt, in view of the DCI's current efforts, that a study of this sort by the Working Group would be redundant and produce a dintinct overkill.

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13. Mr. Marshall said that he was concerned with and felt that a primary function of the Working Group should be that of making sure that consumer needs are adequately transmitted. He felt the narcotics case was similar to the needs in the international economic area where the question is whether or not intelligence agencies are working on what is most needed. Mr. Marshall said he felt a part of the Working Group job was to identify and expand upon new needs.

14. Dr. Hall interposed that the DOD position with respect to Working Group projects was that whatever the Group decided to undertake should be submitted to and specifically approved by the NSCIC itself. He further stated that the projects submitted to NSCIC should be few in number and essentially interdepartmental in character. He said the Working Group should not entertain doing a project which is clearly the business of a single department and can best be done by that department. Dr. Hall proposed that tough criteria were required in every instance, with the primary consideration being given to projects which would have a tangible and solid result.

15. Mr. Tweedy agreed and stated it appeared to be the Group's consensus that a project be included on narcotics intelligence relating to the adequacy of the statement and transmission of consumer needs, and the ability of the collection effort to meet them.

16. Dr. Proctor urged that the first step be a paper on all aspects of what is now being done related to the narcotics problem. This could then be transmitted to the Working Group members for review and further steps considered re a proposal to the NSCIC. This was agreed.

17. The Chairman said he would arrange to have such a paper prepared and transmitted to the members.

18. Dr. Cline made the procedural point that the Group had meet to suggest projects and a program to the NSCIC. Mr. Tweedy agreed the purpose was to get a program for NSCIC review and approval. He proposed that the narcotics paper could help the Group decide what to submit to NSCIC on this subject. Dr. Hall

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noted that if the Working Group decided not to recommend a particular project, this did not preclude an individual NSCIC member from raising it.

19. The Chairman then turned to the first project on the agenda, "Expected Major Requirements for New or Different Intelligence in the Near-to Mid-Term Future."

20. Dr. Proctor thought the subject was too broad and would be very difficult to handle. He suggested the Group hold off on it and get some experience on projects of equal or even more importance which were easier to carry out.

21. Mr. Marshall cited problems posed by trade negotiations and monetary conferences, arguing that it was not at all clear that, in these new need areas, the intelligence needs were being adequately stated and communicated, or that intelligence actions were responsive and adequate.

22. The discussion which followed concluded with Dr. Proctor suggesting that much of the Working Group's initial activity would have to be self-educational. In this context, Dr. Proctor agreed to put together a paper on the economic intelligence problem which would inform the members of the current status of intelligence capabilities and the adequacy of what is being done with respect to the needs stated.

23. General Bennett expressed concern that the Group was tending to disregard the work of USIB in many of the areas concerned with consumer needs, our abilities to respond, and our current gaps. He indicated that the current corpus of the NIEs is in fact an expression of this. Raising the question as to whether the 12 projects proposed were relevant, General Bennett asked whether the problem wasn't one of communicating data to the decision makers without overburdening them, in the same context as raised by Admiral Weinel in his input to the Chairman.

24. The Chairman stated that the action on the first project would be the paper by Dr. Proctor to bring the Group up to date on arrangements and mechanisms within the Community on all aspects of economic intelligence.

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25. Mr. Tweedy then raised the "Case Study of U. S. Intelligence Reaction to a Political-Military Crisis: The India/Pakistan Conflict of 1971."

26. Dr. Cline proposed the project be adopted as an illustrative case history dealing in what was needed, absent, etc. The Group concurred and the Chairman stated that the action would be Mr. Marshall's. Dr. Proctor suggested that it would be desirable to have anything that a consumer says intelligence did or did not do checked with the intelligence agencies.

27. At this point Mr. Mardian indicated to the Chairman that he was obliged to leave, but before doing so wanted it known that the Justice Department considered information on China's intelligence and counterintelligence services to be a priority problem.

25X1A9a 28. Mr. Tweedy pointed out that [redacted] the DCI's China Coordinator, was presenting a summary to USIB on 10 February. He suggested that action on the China project be held in abeyance until the Group had that input available.

29. Mr. Tweedy next turned to the project, "Review of the Supplement to DCID 1/2, U. S. Intelligence Objectives and Priorities." General Bennett suggested the DCID 1/2 and its Supplement be given to Mr. Kissinger for his views since the other NSCIC members were already a party to the paper and aware of it. The basic question to be asked, he said, was whether the DCID accurately reflected the intelligence needs and priorities of major consumers.

30. The Chairman suggested the DCI should send the DCID to Mr. Kissinger and asked Mr. Marshall to query the NSC Staff in terms of the basic question. Mr. Marshall agreed to do so.

31. The Chairman moved to the "Survey of Consumer Reaction to Intelligence Products." It was generally agreed that questionnaires had had poor results in the past and it was agreed to drop the project in its present form.

32. The Chairman then took up the "Review of the NIE-11 Series." Mr. Huizenga suggested that this project be eliminated. He noted that the series had been revised and there was constant communication and feedback from NSC Staff officers and other departments. It was agreed not to pursue this project.

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33. Discussion then turned to "Intelligence Support for SALT Negotiations." General Bennett briefly discussed the problem of intelligence requirements if a SALT agreement was reached. Dr. Proctor noted that after the verification panel had been set up, the reaction to intelligence support had been favorable. Mr. Weiss commented that he had been involved in SALT matters since the beginning and noted that one whole area that had not been touched

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34. Dr. Cline suggested that the SALT item not go into the agenda as written. It was agreed that the Working Group would think about this item and discuss it at the next meeting. Mr. Marshall pointed to the SALT aspect raised by Mr. Weiss as an example of a new approach to intelligence analytical problems.

35. On Dr. Hall's motion, it was agreed the project, "Evaluation Form for Intelligence Products," should not be sponsored by the group.

36. The project, "Survey of the Intelligence Analyst Situation," was noted as being interesting, but it was set aside for the present.

37. The Chairman indicated his staff was preparing a study on "Resources Devoted to Production by the U. S. Intelligence Community," and it was agreed this should be completed.

38. "Research and Development Relating to Intelligence Production," was discussed briefly. Dr. Hall said that this was simply a matter of Defense putting together what it was doing and CIA doing the same. No further action was decided concerning this project.

39. Mr. Tweedy noted this had disposed of all the projects listed on the agenda and asked if any member had additional projects to propose.

40. Mr. Marshall indicated that Mr. Kissinger, upon being queried, had stated a desire for product evaluations of the intelligence contributions to the NSSMs. It was agreed that Mr. Marshall would choose a selected group of current NSSMs for intelligence product evaluations.

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41. The meeting was adjourned at 1630 hours.

42. Summary of actions by Working Group:

a. "Expected Major Requirements for New or Different Intelligence in the Near-to Mid-Term Future"

Action: Papers to be prepared on intelligence actions and intelligence-related activities underway on narcotics (Chairman) and international economic problems (Dr. Proctor) to aid Working Group in considering possible program proposals to NSCIC.

b. "Review of the Supplement to DCID 1/2, U. S. Intelligence Objectives and Priorities"

Action: DCI letter to Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Marshall will query NSC Staff.

c. "Survey of Consumer Reaction to Intelligence Products"

Action: Proposal not approved.

d. "Review of the NIE-11 Series"

Action: Proposal not approved.

e. "Intelligence Support for SALT Negotiations"

Action: Set aside pending further consideration.

f. "Case Study of U. S. Intelligence Reaction to a Political-Military Crisis: The India/Pakistan Conflict of 1971"

Action: Project approved. Mr. Marshall has action.

g. "Evaluation Form for Intelligence Products"

Action: Proposal not approved.

h. "Resources Devoted to Production by the U. S. Intelligence Community"

Action: Project approved. Chairman has action.

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i. "Survey of the Intelligence Analyst Situation"

Action: Consideration deferred.

j. "Research and Development Relating to Intelligence Production"

Action: No action undertaken.

k. "Intelligence Support for U. S. International Economic, Financial and Commercial Policies"

Action: Paper by Mr. Proctor (See a. above)

l. "China as an Intelligence Research and Production Target"

Action: Consideration delayed until next meeting.

m. "Selected Intelligence NSSMs Product Evaluation"

Action: Approved. Mr. Marshall has action.

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